We study the impact of software-based innovation on the value of patented inventions, firms' competitive position in the product market, and the market value of the firms in the U.S. information and technology (IT) hardware industry. Our analysis of over 227,000 patents by 741 public IT hardware firms in the period of 1996-2006 reveals several novel findings. Patented inventions with greater software intensity are more frequently cited and more likely to be renewed for legal protection. This effect is stronger for software patents than non-software patents, though it varies across firms depending on business scope and measures of patent value. Increases in software innovation are associated with greater software contents in the subsequent period's business profile while those of non-software innovation orient business away from software-based products and services, and this pattern is particularly strong for pure IT hardware firms. Greater software innovation also drives the shift toward more software-intensive business, allowing firms to differentiate themselves from rivals in product and service offerings. This differentiation benefit appears unique to pure IT hardware firms. Despite the advantages of pure firms in software-enabled technological value creation and competitive positioning, diversified firms are no less likely to create firm value from software-based innovation. We offer some evidence that firms optimize their innovation strategies along the dimension of exploitation and exploration subject to their business scope constraints. Our study offers one of the first evidence that software innovation helps mitigate product market competition, thereby substantiating a mechanism through which software-based innovation creates economic value. inventions with greater software intensity are more frequently cited and more likely to be renewed for legal protection. This effect is stronger for software patents than non-software
INTRODUCTION
The year 2017 marked the tenth anniversary of iPhone, which has since its introduction spearheaded the colossal growth and value creation at Apple Inc. in the past decade. When iPhone X, the model name signifying the anniversary, was announced, it was neither the super AMOLED retina display nor the A11 bionic chipset that excited expectant consumers the most.
It was the three-dimensional face recognition technology that generated hottest attention and excitement in the market. Who would have thought back in 2007 that the innovations brought by a new mobile device would be increasingly judged by the "soft" side of its functionality rather than its physical specifications? Clearly, this dynamic is very different from the one observed in the traditional phone or PC market. iPhone X thus exemplifies the fundamental shift in the nature of the game played out in the information technology (IT) hardware industry.
The growing importance of software in new product development, market competition and value creation through innovation---broadly termed as "software-based innovation" (Quinn et al. 1996 )---goes far beyond IT hardware. Software has long transformed several industries where products and services are by nature information-intensive, such as books, music, and financial services industries (Shapiro and Varian 1998) , by significantly changing the way products and services are developed and distributed. Software is now playing an increasingly crucial role in industries that are widely viewed as primarily existing in the physical world (Arora et al. 2013; Branstetter et al. 2015; Porter and Heppelmann 2014) . In the automobile industry, for instance, software accounts for about 90% of innovation and 70-80% of revenues from new products and services are software-based (Babar 2014) . General Motors' Chevy Volt runs on ten million lines of code, which is two million more than that of the F-35 fighter jet (Gilliland et al. 2014) . As a result, in today's cars, software is responsible for many core functions such as controlling safety features, entertaining passengers, guiding drivers to destinations, and connecting the cars to various networks. The shift toward software-based innovation is further facilitated by the rapid development in the Internet of Things that enables ubiquitous digital connectivity (Iansiti and Lakhani 2014; Yoo et al. 2010) . The amount of resources committed to software mirrors this trend. Software accounts for an increasingly greater share of cost in product design, and particularly up to 80% of the system-design cost (Allan et al. 2002) . By 2011, software was responsible for 60% of all corporate IT spending, up from 1990's 32% (Sarrazin and Sikes 2013) . Firms in traditionally non-software industries also invest a significant amount of resources on software-based research and development (R&D) (Arora et al. 2013) . Between 1990 and 2012, business investments in software increased at more than twice the rate of all fixed business investments; in 2010-2012, software accounted for 12.2% of all fixed investments, paling the 3.5% for computers and peripherals (Shapiro 2014 ).
The increasing dominance of software in virtually all aspects of firm operation and industry development may be fundamentally changing the way in which firms create and capture value. Software enhances product design, improves speed and agility thereby creating unique customer experience (Quinn et al. 1996) , and allows for creating new business models (Sarrazin and Sikes 2013) , while drastically reducing development costs and time (Gilliland et al. 2014) .
Hence, software has increasingly become a key differentiator for competition (Gilliland et al. 2014) . Reflecting this phenomenon, a survey of CEOs indicates that more than half of the respondents consider software development as key to achieving competitive advantage (IBM 2013) . Porter and Heppellman (2014) discuss how software-enabled products are transforming competition and reshape industry structure, especially in manufacturing industries.
Academic research has noticed the change and recently begun documenting the trends and impacts of software-based innovation at different levels of analysis. At the country level, past two decades have witnessed a systematic shift in the nature of innovation in the IT sector toward increasing dependence on software, and the U.S.'s overall advantage in software research explains the performance advantage of U.S. firms over Japanese counterparts (Arora et al. 2013 ).
Japan's striking decline of their international competitiveness in IT industry is attributed to the failure to recognize the software-based shift in technological opportunities and adapt to that shift (Cole 2006; Cole and Fushimi 2010) . The inter-country differentials in the availability of software engineers partly accounts for the differences in innovation productivity across countries (Arora et al. 2013; Branstetter et al. 2015) . At the firm level, firms with higher software intensity are more productive and garner greater private returns from their R&D, compared to firms with lower software intensity (Branstetter et al. 2015) . At the technology level, patents that cite prior software patents---a proxy for software intensity---on average receive more citations from subsequent patents (Arora et al. 2013 , Branstetter et al. 2015 ) and this pattern is stronger for software patents than non-software patents (Branstetter et al. 2015) .
These pioneering works have opened up exciting opportunities to study how this important phenomenon is developing and impacting the economic performance of firms. Two main findings stand out from this emerging line of literature. First, software-based innovation is increasingly pervasive in both software and non-software industries. Second, differences in software capability significantly account for the performance differential between firms. While offering some initial systematic evidence on the role of software-based innovation, these findings also leave many unanswered questions on the issue. Most important, we have yet to understand how the software-based innovation, which is essentially a technology-level activity, is translated into firm performance that is an organization-level metric, and by what mechanism firms capture the value created from the software-based innovation. This calls for an integrative empirical framework that systematically explicates the relationship between software-based innovation, product market competition, and firm value creation. Our study is a modest step toward addressing this important gap. Specifically, we examine 1) the impact of software-based research on the nature of innovation; 2) the mechanisms through which software-based innovation creates firm value; and 3) the heterogeneity of effect across firm characteristics such as business scope.
Our empirical setting is the U.S. IT hardware industry during the period of 1996-2006.
We investigate our research questions in multiple steps. We first examine whether greater software reliance of an innovation is related a higher value of the focal innovation. This is primarily to establish the baseline relationship found in earlier studies (Arora et al. 2013; Branstetter et al. 2015) . Because in many cases, software forms the core element in process innovations and in creating product functionalities valued by the customers (Quinn et al. 1996) , incorporating more software components into the research process is likely to increase the value of the innovative output. We use patents as incidences of technology-level innovation and the number of citations made to a patent as a measure of the value of the innovation. Patents receiving a greater number of citation can be considered as economically more valuable than those receiving fewer citations (Harhoff et al. 1999 ). We find a significant premium for software patents: compared to non-software patents, software patents on average receive a 13-14% higher number of forward citations. Moreover, there is significantly positive relationship between software intensity---the share of software patents among all citations of prior art ("backward citations")---and the value of the focal patent. Interestingly, this positive effect is most salient for "pure players," i.e., firms whose only business is in IT hardware. For firms that are in both IT hardware and software businesses ("diversified firms with software business"), the effect of software intensity is much more modest and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Another popular indicator of patent value is the probability of renewal (e.g., Pakes (1986)). We further investigate whether software patents are more likely to be renewed. The results indicate that they are. On average, software patents are 1.8% more likely renewed, and this positive effect is persistent across all three periods of renewal (3.5, 7.5. and 11.5 years after the patent grant). Using the share of cited software patents shows a similar pattern. Intriguingly, this renewal effect is persistent only for the diversified firms with software business. For pure players, the positive renewal rate is relatively short-lived, but for the diversified firms with software business, the effect lasts much longer. These results provide strong evidence that greater software intensity of an innovation is associated with a higher value of the innovation.
We then look at whether this technology-level value implication of software-based innovation translates into firm-level value creation. It does. We find that greater software intensity, measured as the cumulative software patent normalized by assets, implies higher firm value, measured in Tobin's Q. Non-software patent intensity, constructed analogously, is also positively related to firm value, but the effect of software intensity is about five times that of non-software patent intensity. Overall, we find significant evidence of a positive link between software intensity of innovation and firm value.
To explore the specific mechanism behind this positive link, we examine whether software R&D output is systematically related to the content of the firm's business. As firms conduct more R&D in software and accumulate innovative output from the R&D, they are likely to increase the software components in their business portfolio in subsequent years. Our finding suggests it is indeed the case. A 10% increase in software R&D output of a firm, measured as the number of software patents filed in a year, is associated with a 2-3% increase in the software content of the firm's business profile in the following year, measured as the frequency of term "software" in the 10-K's business description. This positive association is particularly strong for pure players, while it is effectively zero for the diversified firms with software business. In contrast, the more non-software R&D output a firm produces, the less software content appears in the firm's business profile, a pattern consistent with that of software R&D.
An immediate implication of the significant link between software R&D output and business content is that software-based innovation may drive IT firms to reconfigure their portfolio of products and services to be more distinct from that of competitors, thereby reducing the competitive pressure in the product market (Porter and Heppelmann 2014) . This will help explain the positive link between software-based innovation and firm value creation that we saw earlier. To examine the relationship between software R&D output and product market competition, we use the text-based industry classification (TNIC) scheme (Hoberg and Phillips 2010; Hoberg and Phillips 2016) that defines, and annually updates, the effective industry boundaries based on the vocabularies appearing in 10-K product descriptions. We find that a firm's software R&D output is negatively related to the change in the sum of the firm's "similarity" scores---a score measured as the cosine angle between two vectors of vocabularies contained in the pair firm's 10-K product descriptions---with each of all other firms in the same TNIC industry. This finding suggests that as firms conduct more software R&D, they become less like their competitors in their product portfolio. Notably, software R&D output is also negatively associated with the change in the total similarity with software firms, implying that software-enabled differentiation is achieved not by making IT hardware firms more like software firms, but by making their hardware products more distinct from those of competitors. Moreover, this differentiation effect of software R&D is significant mainly for the pure players. In contrast with the software effect, non-software R&D output is positively related to the change in the total similarity, suggesting that IT hardware firms' R&D, if not on software, increases competition in the product market by making their portfolio more similar to their rivals'.
Our findings together provide strong and systematic evidence for the role of softwarebased innovation in enabling IT hardware firms to produce technologically more valuable R&D output, better differentiate their product offerings in the market, and thereby create shareholder value. Our analysis also reveals considerable heterogeneity in the effect across firms of differing scopes of business. One finding that strikes as potential conundrum is that, despite the pure players' apparent advantage in the efficacy of software-based innovation in terms of technological value and product market competition, diversified firms seem no less able to benefit from software capability in terms of firm-level value creation. Our subsequent analysis shows that firms differ in the way they create value from software-based innovation, in a pattern that is consistent with the exploration-exploitation framework (e.g., Gupta et al. (2006) .
Compared to diversified firms, in software-based innovations pure IT hardware firms are much more likely to explore beyond their existing knowledge domains: the software patents by pure players have a greater share of backward citations in the technology classes they did not cite before. By contrast, diversified firms with software business tend to exploit their existing software capability in building broader technological assets: they are more likely than pure players to cite own software patents in their patents. These together suggest that software-based innovation helps both types of firms to create value but the channel by which it occurs may be heterogeneous, with some relying more on explorative search (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001) while others focusing more on exploitative learning (Brady and Davies 2004) .
Our study joins the growing literature that documents the enabling role of software-based innovation for firms, industries and economies to create and sustain competitive advantage in the national and international markets (Arora et al. 2013; Branstetter et al. 2015; Cole 2006; Cole and Fushimi 2010) . Using the U.S. IT hardware industry as the research setting, we offer one of the first evidence that software R&D helps firms reconfigure their product portfolio and thereby mitigate competitive pressure in the product market. By doing so, we substantiate an important mechanism through which software-based innovation creates firm value (Branstetter et al. 2015; Hall and MacGarvie 2010) . Moreover, we show differential benefits of software-based innovation across firms of varying scopes of business. No particular level of business scope strictly dominates in benefiting from software-based innovation, though focused firms seem able to utilize such innovation strategy more effectively in mitigating product market competition.
Finally, we confirm and extend prior studies on the value of software-based inventions (Arora et al. 2013; Branstetter et al. 2015) by providing additional evidence on the technological and private value of patented inventions. Overall, our study contributes to advancing understanding of this ubiquitous phenomenon that continues to inspire and challenge the managers as they strive to turn the wave to their favor and stay ahead in innovation-based competition.
DATA AND SAMPLE
To examine our research questions, we compile a comprehensive dataset from multiple data sources. We focus on the IT hardware industry because we are mainly interested in the softwareenabled innovation that is incorporated into, and hence improves the functionality of, the primary products and services that firms offer, rather than the software itself as the final product or service. Moreover, the IT hardware industry has experienced an increasing importance of embedded software in the products and now exhibits the highest software intensity in the broader technology sector (Arora et al. 2013) . Hence, software capability is likely to be an important factor in innovating and sustaining competitive edge in the IT hardware industry. On this setting, we aim to examine how non-software IT firms strategically respond to and exploit softwarebased innovation to improve their core physical products and thus create value.
To capture the innovative activities in the U.S. IT hardware industry, we look at the patents filed with U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) by U.S. firms in the industry. We obtained the data on these patents from the Harvard U.S. Patent Inventor Database, which covers U.S. patents between 1975 and 2010 (Li et al. 2014) . From this dataset, we collect for each patent the patent identifier, application date, grant date, primary technology class, inventor names, assignee name, the number of claims, the list of backward citations, and the list of forward citations. We download patent renewal data from the USPTO website via a web crawler.
To identify software patents, we build on prior studies and take the following steps for the identification. We first screen patents using the 11 International Patent Classification (IPC) class groups proposed in Graham and Mowery (2003) . We also use a set of software-related keywords ("software" and "computer program") to restrict to patents with these keywords in the title and abstract (Bessen and Hunt 2007) . We then take the intersection of the patent class-based set and the keywords-based set to determine software patents (Arora et al. 2013) .
We obtain market capitalization data and other firm characteristics from COMPUSTAT.
These data are primarily used to examine firm-level value implications of software-based innovation. To ensure the availability of these data, we restrict the sample to publicly listed firms. To match the patent data to the COMPUSTAT data, we use the concordance in Kogan et al. (2017) who provide the link between the patents in the Harvard Patent Inventor Database and the CRSP stock identifiers. We then use firm GVKEY in their link file to identify the assignee firm of each patent in our sample and retrieve the firm's accounting information. Following the literature (e.g., Fleming et al. (2007) , we use the application year rather than the grant year of a patent because the application date should be closer to the actual timing of the R&D activity.
On the business orientation and product market competition, we use firm 10-K data from the SEC's EDGAR website. Based on the descriptions in these annual reports, we determine the firms' business contents and the relative positions of their product and service portfolios in the market. For the specific measure of "similarity," which is our measure of product market competition, we rely on the TNIC dataset (Hoberg and Phillips 2010; Hoberg and Phillips 2016) that is constructed from the textual analysis of 10-K reports. We also use the COMPUSTAT's Segment data to identify the level of diversification and the type of business segments the firms operate in. We classify each firm into one of the three categories: pure firms, diversified firms with software business, and diversified firms without software business. This is to examine the possible heterogeneity of effect across types of firms.
For most analysis, we limit the sample period to 1996-2006. There are several reasons for this decision. First, we focus on the period after software patentability has been substantially expanded due to favorable shifts in legal environments, particularly after the 1995 USPTO guideline that allowed for patenting on software embedded into any hardware product (Hall and MacGarvie 2010) . Second, for most firms the SEC's EDGAR data are available only from 1996 and so are the TNIC data. Third, the Harvard Patent and Inventor database covers patents granted by December 2010, and we want to secure some minimum time for a filed patent to be granted (typically 2-3 years) and cited by patents that are included in the database. We remove firms with no R&D expense reported during the whole sample period. Our final sample contains 741 public non-software IT firms with 159,589 patents, of which 25,101 (15.7%) are software patents.
SOFTWARE-BASED INNOVATION AND PATENT VALUE Empirical Implementation
We first conduct a patent-level analysis to examine whether software-based innovation is positively correlated with the value of a patent. Software-based innovation is captured in two ways. First, we construct a dummy to indicate a software patent, as defined by our criteria described earlier. This variable is used in direct tests of whether the software innovation by IT hardware firms is more valuable than the non-software innovation by these firms. Second, we compute the share of software patents among the total backward citations of a patent, which indicates the patent's reliance on prior software inventions. About 15% of backward citations in our sample are software patents. The greater the reliance of a patent on prior software innovations, the stronger is the software intensity of the patent's underlying knowledge base.
This variable is thus used to examine the relationship between the software intensity of the innovation's knowledge base and the value of the resulting innovation. These two measures are relatively highly correlated but reasonably distinct from each other (r = 0.67).
We operationalize the value of a patent in two ways. The first is the number of forward citations made to a patent. Though not without its limitations (Gambardella et al. 2008; Gittelman 2008) , this has been established as one of the popular metrics of patent value in the literature (Gittelman and Kogut 2003; Singh et al. 2016; Trajtenberg 1990 ). For our second measure of patent value, we exploit patent renewal data. The USPTO requires the patent holder to pay a renewal fee at the end of 3.5 years, 7.5 years and 11.5 years, respectively, after the patent issuance. If the patent holder fails to pay the required fee within the specified period, the patent expires and hence loses the legal protection. As long as a patent is deemed economically valuable, the patent holder will pay the required fee to avoid the expiry of the patent protection (Pakes 1986; Schankerman and Pakes 1986) . The length of the patent renewal may also indicate the duration for which the patent remains valuable to its owner. Based on this notion, we construct two measures: a dummy indicating whether a patent is let expired and a dummy indicating whether the required fee is paid for a patent at the end of each renewal period.
Firms differ in their product portfolios and the resource endowments, and hence their approaches to innovation and ability to appropriate from the innovation are also likely to be different (Teece 1988) . Hence, to explore the possible heterogeneity in the effects across different types of firms, we classify each firm into one of the three categories: pure firms (whose businesses belong only to one of the three-digit SIC (SIC3) IT industries), diversified firms with software business (whose businesses belong to multiple SIC3 industries including the software industry), and diversified firms without software business (whose businesses include multiple SIC3 industries but not the software industry). We construct several patent-level control variables that are shown to influence our measures of patent value. The number of inventors is to control for the influence from differences in team size. The number of backward citations controls for the variations in the overall reliance on prior art. We construct citation age---the difference between the application year of a focal patent and the median application year of its backward citations---to control for the temporal effect in citation hazard. We also construct a dummy variable, self-citation, to control for the potential path-dependence of innovations within an organizational boundary (Greve and Seidel 2015) . We also control for the number of non-patent references that is shown to be correlated with future citations (Fleming and Sorenson 2004) . The number of claims is also included, because patents with more claims tend to receive more citations (Nerkar and Paruchuri 2005 , where $% & is the share of patents in patent class j cited by patent i and C is the number of unique patent classes cited by patent i. We also construct inventor capability, defined as the sum of the forward citations made to all prior patents of the inventor team, which controls for the differences in the ability of inventors.
Similarly, we include inventor degree centrality to capture the network size of the inventor team.
This variable is constructed as the average number of unique co-inventors of the focal patent's inventor team in the previous three years. Finally, to control for the systematic differences in citation patterns across firms, patent classes, and application years, we include corresponding fixed effects. Table 1A presents the summary statistics and correlations of these variables.
The base regression model for this analysis is the following:
where the subscript represents patent i by firm f in patent class p and in year t. Y denotes either the log of the number of forward citations or a dummy for patent renewal/expiry decisions. SP represents a dummy for software patent or the level of software intensity. X includes a vector of patent-specific characteristics that may be correlated with patent value. α 9 , α : , and α ; are firm-, patent class-, and application year-fixed effects, respectively. In all models, we use robust standard errors clustered by firms. We use an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation because of the method's easier comparison between different types of firms and the battery of fixed effects we include in the models. Results are robust to alternative estimation methods such as negative binomial or logistic regressions. On average, software patents receive more citations than do non-software patents. To the extent that the number of forward citations represents the value of a patent, the result indicates that for the IT hardware firms, their software patents command higher value than their nonsoftware patents. This is an intriguing result considering that software is not the main business of these firms. The effect is also economically significant. The estimates in Model 3 imply that software patents receive 12.7% more citations than non-software patents. That translates into about 1.4 more citations per patent, which is sizeable given that the median number of citations any patent receives is four. Moreover, software intensity is significantly and positively related to the number of forward citations (Model 4). The estimated coefficient implies that a change of software intensity from zero to one is associated with a 20.6% increase in the number of forward citations. This is consistent with prior studies' finding that patents citing a software patent are cited more frequently by future patents (Arora et al. 2013; Branstetter et al. 2015) . A breakdown into software patents and non-software patents (Models 5 and 6) shows that the positive association between software intensity and patent value is stronger for software patents (19.3%) than for non-software patents (13.9%). The control variables behave in line with expectations:
Results of Patent Value Analysis
patents with a larger team, more patent and non-patent references, higher-quality inventors, and more claims receive more forward citations, while patents that build on older technology or a broader set of technologies draw fewer citations. Overall, the results suggest that software-based innovation is strongly and positively related to the value of the resulting innovation. Table 4 shows the patent value analysis with the firms split into three types based on their business scope. The same set of control variables as in Table 2 are included in all models, so we only present the coefficients involving the firm type variables, where the base category is pure IT hardware firms. Estimates in Model 1 suggest that the citation advantage of software patents over non-software is strongest for pure IT hardware firms (17.6% more citations). The effect is more muted for the diversified firms (7.4% for diversified firms with software business and 13.2% for diversified firms without software business). A similar pattern is found for the effect of software intensity on forward citations (Model 2). In both cases, pure firms largely drive such a positive relationship. For non-software patents, the estimated coefficient is practically zero for the diversified firms with software business (Model 4). These results show that the estimates reported in Table 2 conceal the considerable heterogeneity in the effect across firm types. Table 4 presents the results when the probability of patent renewal is used as an alternative measure of patent value. On average, software patents are 1.8% less likely to expire than non-software patents (Model 1). This suggests that, when pooled across the renewal periods, software patents are more likely to be renewed by the patent holders than non-software patents are. The analysis split by different check points of patent renewal also shows that in each of the renewal periods, the likelihood that a renewal fee is paid is significantly higher for software patents than for non-software patents (Models 2-4). This result indicates that software patents are deemed more valuable to the IT hardware firms than non-software patents. The analysis using the share of software backward citations shows a similar pattern: software intensity is negatively related to the likelihood of patent expiry (Model 5). This is consistent with the results from forward citations-based analysis. Patents with greater software intensity are also consistently more likely to be renewed at every renewal period (Models 6-8).
The relationship between software-based innovation patent renewal, however, seems heterogeneous across firms. In Table 5 , we repeat the analysis of patent renewal, this time with each software patent variable interacted with the indicators of firm types. On this analysis, we do find lower likelihoods of patent expiry for software patents, but the effects are much weaker than in the previous analysis and vary across firm types (Model 1). The coefficient is significant only for the diversified firms with software business (-0.033, p-value=0.002) while it is negative but insignificant for pure firms and is effectively zero for the diversified firms without software business. When examined by the period of fee payment (Models 2-4), software patents by pure IT hardware firms are more likely to be renewed than non-software patents in the first renewal period but not beyond that. For the diversified firms with software business, the renewal probability of software patents remains similar to that of pure firms during the first two payment periods but turns significantly higher in the third renewal period. In contrast, the renewal propensities of the diversified firms without software business is statistically indistinguishable from those of pure firms. These results suggest that the diversified firms with software business may be able to appropriate value from their software patents over a longer period than other types of firms. We find the same pattern from the analysis using the share of cited software patents to capture software intensity (Models 5-8). The positive association between software intensity and patent renewal is most salient for the diversified firms, for whom the effect persists through the last renewal point. The effect is relatively short-lived for pure IT hardware firms.
Together, these results confirm the positive association between software-based innovation and patent value found in the analysis using forward citations (Table 3) , while reiterating the heterogeneity of the effect of across firm types also found in the previous analysis (Table 3) .
SOFTWARE-BASED INNOVATION AND MARKET VALUE Empirical Implementation
The previous section's analysis shows that software patents and patents with greater reliance on software technology command higher value in terms of the number of forward citations and the probability of renewal. To the extent that our metrics of patent value, especially the renewals, capture the private economic value accrued to the patent holders, we should expect that R&D in software technology and software-enabled innovations creates shareholder value for the firm. To examine this, we estimate the market value of firms, operationalized as Tobin's Q, as a function of their accumulated software innovations. We build on the well-known market value function (Griliches 1981; Hall et al. 2005) , in which the market value of firm i in year t is modelled as a function of their physical assets (A ,/ ) and knowledge assets ( ,/ ), formalized as the following:
In this equation, $; represents firm i's market value in year t, $; is the market valuation coefficient of firm i's assets and captures the possibility that knowledge assets are valued differently from physical assets. We assume that $; may vary across time and by firm size. is a scale factor and is assumed to equal 1 (Hall et al. 2005) . After taking logs of both sides of equation (2) 
where RD is firm i's R&D stock, SP is the software patent stock, and NSP the non-software patent stock. We distinguish between software patents and non-software patents to isolate the value creation effect of software-based innovation, apart from the influence of innovative activities in non-software technology. We apply the nonlinear least squares (NLS) method to estimate equation (4) with approximation (Hall et al. 2005; Simeth and Cincera 2015) .
We measure Tobin's Q as the ratio of a firm's market value to its book value of assets, where the market value equals the market value of common stock plus the book value of assets less the sum of book value of common stock. The R&D and patent stocks are calculated using the perpetual inventory method with an annual depreciation rate of 15% (Hall and MacGarvie 2010) . Table 1B presents the summary statistics and correlations of these firm-level variables.
Results of Tobin's Q Analysis
The results of this Tobin's Q analysis are shown in Table 6 . Model 1 only includes controls, R&D intensity and firm size along with year fixed effects. Both coefficients on R&D intensity and sales exhibit positive signs, consistent with the literature (Arora et al. 2013; Hall and McGarvie 2010) . Model 2 adds to the model the firm-level stock measure of software intensity.
This variable is significantly and positively associated with Tobin's Q. The estimate implies that an increase in software patent intensity from zero to one is associated with over 2.5 times increase in Tobin's Q. This strongly indicates the powerful value creation function of softwarebased innovation. Model 3 adds the stock of non-software patents as an additional control. The coefficient on software intensity remains little changed. The non-software patent intensity is also positively related to Tobin's Q, but its magnitude is only a fifth of the software patent intensity.
Given that IT hardware is the main business of our sample firms, this is a remarkable result and again testifies to the critical role of software capability in creating value for these firms.
In Models 4-5 we further include the interactions between software R&D variables and firm type indicators. As in other analyses, pure IT hardware firms form the base category in these regressions. The coefficient on software patent intensity is strongly positive, exhibiting a similar magnitude of effect in Models 2 and 3. The coefficients on the two interaction terms involving the diversified firm types diverge in their directions but appear imprecisely estimated with relatively large standard errors. The estimates thus suggest comparable positive returns to software patent intensity regardless of the firm type. The results stay qualitatively similar when the non-software patent stocks are also interacted with firm type dummies (Model 5). On surface, this result seems inconsistent with the patent-level results that indicate significant advantages of pure firms in creating and appropriating value from software-based innovation. We revisit this point later and attempt to provide suggestive evidence of potential heterogeneity in the way in which different types of firms create and capture value from their software-based innovation.
SOFTWARE INNOVATION AND THE SOFTWARE ORIENTATION OF BUSINESS Empirical Implementation
Our analyses of patent value and Tobin's Q both point to the role of software capability in driving value for the firms that increasingly base their innovations in software technology. Now, developing and integrating software components into other technologies is fundamentally a technology level activity, while Tobin's Q is a highly-aggregated measure of firm value and can reflect many different activities occurring inside and outside of the firm. Thus, what remains to be shown is how the micro-level processes and their outcomes are converted into tangible value at the organization level; there must be some concrete mechanisms that link the patent level value creation and the firm level value creation. We explore these mechanisms by analyzing the changes in software orientation of 10-K business descriptions (this section) and by looking at the changes in the semantic distance from competition in product and service descriptions (next section). These two represent intermediate level firm activities and hence will help specify the channels through which technology-level activities are connected to firm-level value creation.
We first examine the relationship between software patenting and the software content of a firm's business portfolio. This is to see how software R&D influences the direction of firm business in software-related areas. The more software R&D projects are conducted by a firm, the more software-related business the firm will get into. We capture the software orientation by counting the frequency of 'software' word in the 10-K business description. The assumption is that the more frequently 'software' appears in 10-K, the greater is the firm's focus on softwarebased products and services in its business operation. The baseline model for this test is:
where the subscript represents firm i in industry s at year t. Y denotes the number of the term 'software' in 10-K. SP refers to the number of software patents, and X includes vectors of firmspecific characteristics that potentially affect the firm's business strategy and the industry's competitive environment. Included in X are the log of R&D intensity, the log of total assets, sales growth rate in the previous 2 years, and the dummies for no R&D, no patent and no software patent, respectively. We also include the number of total words in 10-K to control for the length of 10-K statements. We include the number of non-software patents to control for the level of a firm's innovations in non-software areas. ]($) and ; are SIC3-and year-fixed effects. To avoid simultaneity, we lag independent variables by one year. Standard errors are clustered by firms. Table 7 presents the results from this analysis. The number of software patents filed by a firm in each year is strongly and positively correlated with the number of software keywords appearing in 10-K statements in the following year (Model 1). The effect is also quite sizeable: a 10% increase in the number of software patents translates into a 2.2% increase in the frequency of 'software' term in the following year's business description. In contrast, the number of non-software patents is negatively related to the number of 'software' word in 10-K filings (Model 2). Together, these suggest that as firms conduct more software R&D, they shift the focus of business more toward software-based products and services. A breakdown analysis by firm type (Models 3-4) shows that the positive relationship of software R&D output and software orientation is stronger for pure IT hardware firms than for diversified firms with software business. Given their already-diversified scope of business, it appears reasonable that the marginal increase of software orientation in these firms' business is smaller than that of pure IT firms. In fact, the net effect of software patents for the diversified firms with software business is not statistically different from zero, suggesting little correlation between software R&D output and software orientation of business for this type of firms. For the diversified firms without software business, the effect is generally comparable to that of pure IT firms, though it becomes marginally larger when non-software patents are further accounted for (Model 4). Together, we find evidence that firms on average increase their focus on software-based product and service offerings as they conduct more software R&D and that this effect varies across firm types with the pure IT hardware firms exhibiting some of the strongest effects of software patenting.
Results on the Software Orientation of Business

SOFTWARE INNOVATION AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION Empirical Implementation
If, as we find in the foregoing analysis, firms respond to the growing importance of softwarebased innovation by adjusting their R&D portfolios and the software component of their business operation, we should further expect to see a close connection between software innovation and the competition in the product market. In particular, as products and services become increasingly software-dependent (Branstetter et al. 2015) , the nature of competition and the business strategies in an industry may change accordingly (Porter and Heppelmann 2014; Porter and Heppelmann 2015) . For instance, product innovations that integrate greater software-based functionality may reduce competition from rivals by making their products more distinct from others and also increase barriers to imitative entry by raising the bar (Porter and Heppelmann 2014) . This could then enable firms to generate financial returns from their software-based innovation. We thus set out to examine how a firm's software R&D and innovation is related to the firm's competitive position in the product market.
Measuring product market competition is challenging. The standard measures based on SIC or NAICS codes such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index are inherently limited as the traditional industry classifications are static and rigid (Tang 2006) . The static nature of these measures is particularly limiting because market boundaries are increasingly blurred due to technological convergence and cut-throat competition in the IT industry with rapid entries of new firms and exits of incumbents (Lee et al. 2010; McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2008) . More critical for our purpose, an industry-level measure of competition cannot capture the changes in individual firm-specific competitive positions against their rivals. To meaningfully relate a firm's software-based innovation to its competitive position in the market, the measure should properly capture the competitive pressure that is specific to the firm that conducts the innovative activity.
Thus, we resort to the TNIC scheme pioneered by Hoberg and Phillips (2010; , which allows for measuring the competitive positions of individual firms within the effectively and dynamically defined boundary of a product market. Specifically, the TNIC scheme is constructed from the textual analysis of the vocabularies contained in firm 10-K product descriptions. Using these vocabularies, it computes the pairwise cosine similarity score between any two vectors of vocabularies, where each vector represents a firm's product portfolio. Hence, under this scheme, firms using a similar set of product market vocabularies are classified as belonging to the same industry. This allows for a more accurate measure of competition that reflects the dynamic nature of the IT hardware industry. Moreover, unlike in the fixed industry classification systems (e.g., SIC, NAICS), each firm has its own TNIC industry with a different set of firms within that industry, because by construction each firm faces a unique set of vocabulary vectors (i.e., firms) whose pairwise similarities with the focal firm fall above a pre-specified threshold. The TNIC scheme and the similarity scores are updated every year as firms report new 10-K documents.
This annual update of the entire TNIC product space ensures that ongoing product innovations are timely reflected in the market boundaries and the effective group of rivals of an individual firm. Research has demonstrated that the TNIC-based industry definition significantly improves over the static industry classification schemes in accounting for many firm level decisions (e.g., Hoberg and Philips (2016; Kim et al. 2016) . To determine the competitive pressure a firm faces in the product market, we first take the firm's pairwise similarity scores with all other firms within its TNIC industry and then compute the sum of these similarity scores. Thus, a higher total similarity score implies that the firm's product offerings are more similar to those of other firms in the same market boundary and hence the firm is likely to face a greater competitive pressure in the product market. We then relate the year-over-year change in the total similarity score to the level of software innovation in the prior year.
The baseline equation takes the following form:
where the subscript represents firm i in industry s at year t. Y denotes the level of competitive pressure that a firm faces in the product market, operationalized as the total score of similarities with other firms in the same TNIC. We are interested in the change because we want to examine whether greater software-based innovation of a firm leads to reduced competition in the corresponding product market. (We also consider the number of firms in the same TNIC as an alternative measure of product market competition and obtain similar results.) SP refers to the number of software patents, our measure of software-based innovation, and X includes vectors of firm-specific characteristics, which are equivalent to those in equation (4) absent the number of total words. ]($) and ; are SIC3-and year-fixed effects. We lag all independent variables by one year in the analysis. Because our dependent variable captures the change from year t to year t+1, we are essentially correlating the level of software innovation to the change in the product market competition two years after. We report robust standard errors clustered by firms.
Results of Product Market Competition
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 8 . Model 1 presents the estimated coefficient on the number of software patents, controlling for the number of non-software patents along with a host of control variables used in Table 7 . The coefficient indicates a strongly negative association between software patents and the change in the total similarity with other firms in the TNIC industry. The effect is economically significant, implying that a 10% increase in the number of software patents is associated with an additional 5.8% decrease in the total similarity.
This implies that the more software patents innovation conducted by a firm in a year, the more dissimilar becomes the firm's product and service offering to that of rivals two years later. Put differently, patenting in software technology helps IT hardware firms to increase differentiation from rivals in the product market, thereby lessening the competitive pressure from rivals. This confirms our expectation and in fact is consistent with the predictions in Porter and Heppelmann (2014) . The coefficient on non-software patents is positive, though insignificant, suggesting a potentially competition-enhancing effect of non-software R&D. This result is also reasonable,
given that the main business of IT hardware firms more heavily involves innovations in non-software technologies; conducting R&D in areas where everyone else is also making considerable investments may render the product market congested with products more similar to those of rivals.
In Models 2 and 3, we focus on a subset of firms in a focal firm's TNIC industry. Some firms in a TNIC industry may belong to the same SIC3 as the focal firm's. This narrower definition of rivals may more directly capture the competitive pressure the focal firm faces with other IT hardware firms. Also, some firms in the TNIC industry may be classified as belonging to the software industry (i.e., SIC3 737), and thus represent competition with firms in software business. Examining a subset of firms within the TNIC industry hence likely helps identify whether software-based innovation mitigates the rivalry with other IT hardware firms, or with other software firms, or both. When we limit the firms with the same SIC3 code as the focal firm (Model 2), the number of software patents is still negatively related to the changes in the similarity, confirming the differentiation effect of software innovation from those firms.
Moreover, the coefficient on software patents stays significantly negative when the total similarity of the focal firm is computed in relation with the firms whose primary business is software (Model 3). This suggests that conducting more R&D and innovation in software technologies does not make IT hardware firms become more like software firms. It is the integration of software innovation with the hardware products that make the IT hardware firms unique and capable of profiting from their software-based innovation. These results together demonstrate the competition-reducing effect of software innovation.
When we split the firms based on their business scope (Model 4), only the coefficient for the pure firms stays negative, while that of other types of firms is either positive (diversified firms with software business) or generally insignificant (diversified firms without software business). This suggests that the differentiation benefit of software innovation is largely exclusive to pure IT hardware firms. For the diversified firms, the net effect of software innovation is virtually zero, especially for those with software business. The divergence of this differentiation effect between firm types generally holds when the similarity is compared to the firms within the same SICs (Model 5) or to the software firms (Model 6). Together, the results suggest that software-based innovation helps IT hardware firms differentiate their products and services from those of their rivals and thereby mitigate the competitive pressure in the corresponding product market and that this competition-reducing effect is particularly strong for the firms who are specialized in IT hardware technologies.
DISCUSSION
Our results offer a highly probable link between the technology-level value-creation effect of software innovation and the firm-level value implication thereof. By reorienting business portfolios more toward software-based products and services and thereby increasingly differentiating themselves from rivals, firms conducting software-based innovation may effectively reduce competitive pressures from the product market, which then leads to superior market performance and greater shareholder values. At the same time, these results also leave a puzzle: despite the clear advantages of pure players in software-enabled technological value creation and product market positioning, why do we not observe a similar advantage in firm value creation? In other words, how do the diversified firms, particularly those that also operate in the software industry, create shareholder value from software-based innovation, if not through increased differentiation in the product market? One possible cue we get from our results is that, compared to other firms, diversified firms with software business are significantly more likely to renew their software patents and hold them for a longer period. This points to potential differences in the way firms appropriate from their software innovations. For instance, higher patent renewal rates over longer time horizons might suggest greater degrees of exploitation of the innovation output by those firms. Also, considering the exploration-exploitation framework (Gupta et al. 2006) , firms that are less exploitative of their innovation output might instead utilize more explorative R&D. We thus speculate on possible explanations to this apparent puzzle by investigating different innovation strategies across firm types in the form of exploitation and exploration. Our purpose here is not to provide definitive evidence for reconciling our main findings, but to offer a possible explanation for it.
We first examine how IT hardware firms rely on their prior software innovations to generate new ones by looking at their patterns of self-citing own software patents. To the extent that citing own prior patents in subsequent patents represents a firm's exploitation of its existing knowledge assets, higher rates of self-citation should indicate more exploitative learning (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001; Song et al. 2003) . Given our interest in the variation across firm types, we focus specifically on which types of firms are more likely to self-cite their prior software patents. The results of this patent-level analysis are presented in Table 9 , where we vary the sample to software patents (Models 1-3) and all patents (Models 4-6). In some models, we further control for the inventor team size and the total number of backward citations along with fixed effects of application year and patent class, respectively. In Model 1 in which we only include firm type variables, we find that diversified firms with software business are slightly more likely than pure firms to self-cite own prior software patents in producing a new software patent, though the difference seems imprecisely estimated. In contrast, diversified firms without software business are significantly less likely to self-cite software patents compared to both types of firms. These differences between firm types remain largely unchanged when we add in Model 2 the fixed effects for patent class and year to control for potential variations in self-citation patterns due to differences in technology and timing. Self-citation patterns can also vary for reasons unrelated to firms' learning strategies. For instance, self-citations may be more likely for patents with larger inventor teams and greater reliance on prior art. Hence, we further control for these attributes in Model 3. (Results are robust to including all control variables except selfcitation dummy in Table 2 ). With these additional controls, the coefficient on the diversified firms with software business turns significant (at the 10% level), while that on the diversified firms without software business stays significantly negative. The magnitude of difference is also considerable: compared to the pure IT hardware firms, the diversified firms with software business are 5.7% more likely to cite their own software patents, while the diversified firms without software business are 7.1% less likely to do so. These estimates suggest that IT hardware firms may indeed differ in the degree of utilizing their existing software technologies, with the diversified firms with software business relying the most on exploitative learning followed by pure firms and then by the diversified firms without software business. This cross-type difference in exploitative learning appears specific to software innovations, as we find no differences in self-citing patterns when we use non-software patents (Models 4-6, especially Model 6).
Explorative search represents another form of innovation and learning strategy in which firms search outside their existing knowledge base to identify, acquire and assimilate new knowledge component thereby generating novel inventions (March 1991; Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001 ). We thus turn to the potential heterogeneity in firms' exploration strategies by examining how firms differ in utilizing knowledge in unfamiliar technology areas to generate software and non-software innovations. Table 10 presents the results of this analysis. To capture the degree of explorative search, we use the share of patents cited by a focal patent that are from the technology classes that a focal firm has never cited (Katila and Ahuja 2002) . Again, our focus is on the variation across firm types, and thus we present the coefficients on these firm type indicators. In some models, we further include the same set of patent-level attributes as those in Table 3 . On the sample of software patents (Models 1-3), we find that compared to the diversified firms, pure IT hardware firms exhibit greater reliance on prior knowledge from unfamiliar technology classes. The estimates suggest that for these pure firms, the ratio of new knowledge used in generating a software patent is 1.1%p higher than that of the diversified firms with software business. The pure firms' edge in explorative search remains robust to variations of additional controls (Models 2 and 3). In contrast, the difference in the reliance on new knowledge does not seem to vary within the diversified firms. Similar results are found when we look at non-software patents (Models 4-6), and in fact the effect size almost doubles on this sample (Model 6).
Together, the analyses presented in Tables 9 and 10 suggest that the IT hardware firms might employ different innovation strategies on the dimension of exploitation and exploration (Gupta et al. 2006) . Given that both exploitation and exploration are important for learning (March 1991) and firm value creation (Uotila et al. 2009 ), firms might be optimizing their innovation strategy by putting greater emphasis on the mode of learning in a way that maximizes the outcomes, particularly subject to the constraints in product portfolios and resource endowments. Our findings from the IT hardware industry are consistent with this expectation.
Moreover, they also suggest that the process by which firms create value from software-based innovation may be diverse. For some firms, software-enabled innovations may lead to superior performance by allowing the firms to explore more and better differentiate from their rivals in the product market. For others, software-based performance improvements may come through the greater ability of these firms to exploit their existing technology bases and thus better spread the cost of innovation across broader lines of businesses they operate in. Either way, softwarebased innovation can facilitate the creation of economic value for the firms.
CONCLUSION
The past two decades have witnessed a drastic shift from hardware to software as a primary driver of product and service innovations. This implies a characteristic change in the way firms create and capture value from their R&D and innovation. It is still an ongoing phenomenon, with the speed of change ever accelerating. To quickly see this, one needs to look no further than the historic growths of leading technology firms, now-famously called FANG, an acronym for Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, and Google. Commonalities between these firms? They all started less than 20 years ago but today are some of the largest technology companies in the world, and software or software-enabled products and services are the crown jewel of their businesses. In 2017 only, these four firms together added more than $600 billion to the total market cap, which is 13.8% of the total increase in the U.S. market cap. It is certainly not an exaggeration when Marc Andreessen, a famed Silicon Valley venture capitalist, once said that software is eating the world. Given the seemingly unstoppable trend, it appears imperative for firms and managers to figure out ways to not just ride out this trend but to even turn the tide to their favor. This is also an important question for strategy scholars as software capability has become a pivotal force in driving performance differentials in this increasingly digitizing business world. By empirically examining how software-based innovation is being played out in the IT hardware industry, our study joins and extends earlier studies in taking some initial yet important steps in this quest.
With enthusiasm, we invite others to also join in this exciting journey into the underexplored world of software-based innovation. Table 2 , such as ln(number of total inventors), ln(number of backward citations), citation age, a dummy for self-citation, technology breadth, inventor capability, ln(number of claims), ln(number of non-patent backward citations), inventor degree centrality, and the two dummies for diversified firm types. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 3 . Firm-, year-, and patent class-fixed effects are also included in all models. Table 3 . Firm-, year-, and patent class-fixed effects are also included in all models. (R&D intensity) , ln(total asset), sales growth rate, and the dummies indicating no R&D, no patent, and no software patent, respectively. SIC3-, year-, and SIC3*year-fixed effects are also included in all models. All independent variables are lagged by one year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
